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FOREWORD 
This study presents the Northeast Regional Model (NEREGON) for 
northeast Thailand. It is the first in a series of regional models to 
be constructed and applied for Thailand. For the Northeast, the model 
is of the "first generation" and further model work will continue. Also, 
a larger demographic and economic data base is being built up in the re-
gion to facilitate improved models and analytical work. 
Northeast Thailand was selected as the region for initiating regional 
studies because income in this agricultural region lags behind that of 
other regions. This fact has been recognized in the national interregional 
programming model developed in the Division of Agricultural Economics 
(DAE). The national model has been applied to develop five-year plans 
that focus special attention on the Northeast and in raising income of the 
region relative to other regions. 
Other members of the DAE staff and the ISU research team also made 
large contributions to the research reported. 
Somnuk Sriplung 
Director, Division of 
Agricultural Economics 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
Royal Thai Government 
Earl 0. Heady 
Director, Center for Agricultural 
and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
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INTRODUCTION! 
Agricultural production response holds the key to economic 
development in Northeast Thailand--a region with 43.5 percent of the 
agricultural land, 43.3 percent of the nation's agricultural population, 
and 35.9 percent of the incomes below the national average. ·The plight 
of the Northeast farmer has long been recognized, but the solution to 
his problem has been much more elusive. Previous national plans have 
set targets and even identified specific crops for special promotion 
programs. A land reform program is currently underway. Economic incen-
tives have been introduced and withdrawn via fluctuations in world demand 
and the potential export market. Proposals are now being considered to 
expand production so agriculture can absorb its own surplus, as well as 
projected surpluses from other sectors. The key to evaluating whether 
any or all of these programs are feasible lies in understanding what 
potential there is for adjustments, and simultaneously, how these adjust-
ment might affect the rest of the agricultural sector and economy [5]. 
Scope and Limitations 
This study is a normative supply study which focuses specifically 
on the adjustment potential and impact of four major crops in the Northeast 
1The research reported in this paper wa~ supported by the Royal Thai 
Government, Iowa State University, and USOM/Thailand through the coopera-
tive Agricultural Sector Analysis Program (AID/CM/SA-C-73-19). The authors 
are especially grateful for the support and assistance of Dr. Earl 0. 
Heady, Curtiss Distinguished Professor of Economics, Iowa State University 
and Dr. Somnuk Sriplung, Director, Division of Agricultural Economics, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, RIG. 
1 
2 
and Thai economy--rice, kenaf, cassava, and maize. Much of the rice in 
the Northeast is consumed within the region, but kenaf, cassava, and 
maize are primarily exported through the central port at Bangkok. The 
study focuses on these four crops not only because of their importance in the 
economy, but also because of their apparent adaptability to the rainfed 
agriculture of the Northeast. The study is designed to examine potential 
production adjustment and impact of one commodity at a time, while hold-
ing all other factors constant. The linear programming model contains 
a finite number of production activities, each with fixed technology. 
The model is specified with a given resource base and that base remains 
constant throughout the study. For many crops the model contains several 
production activities reflecting different levels of technology. Con-
sequently, the model is free to make some technical substitutions by 
selecting alternative production activities for the same <::.ommodity. 
This study is not an examination of historic producer resp~nse. 
The model was developed and validated against cross-sectional Sl.,lrvey data. 
The optimization procedure used in this model contains 110 lagged adjust-
ments, so the desired level of production is reached immediately. From 
a development standpoint, immediate adjustment is not realistic, but 
that does not detract from the value of the analysis. It simply implies 
that if production response does hold a potential key for solving some of 
the problems of Northeast agriculture, additional studies will be needed 
to determine a reasonable adjustment schedule. Numerous other development 
stt,1dies have been conducted and are available as references on rate of 
producer response. The focus of this study is upon the end to which the 
3 
producer would strive if he optimized income subject to his resource 
contraints. There is sufficient evidence in Thailand to support the 
hypothesis that farmers do basically optimize income (home consumption 
plus cash income). 
The primary objective of this study is to estimate production 
response of the four selected crops under a wide range of assumed prices. 
The secondary objective is to examine the impact on resource use, produc-
tion patterns of other commodities, and on employment and income potential 
in the Northeast. 
Model, Methodology and Assumptions 
The Northeast Regional Model (NEREGON) is the first in a series 
of regional planning models to be constructed in Thailand [6]. The 
region under study includes the 15 Changwats (provinces) of Northeast 
Thailand which have been aggregated into five agroeconomic zones for 
agricultural planning purposes by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives [3]. The Northeast covers an area of approximately 99.3 
million rai 1 of which 35.9 million rai is forest area and 25.9 million 
rai is agricultural land holdings [3, pp. 9-12]. Rainfall for the in-
dividual zones in the region ranges from a low of 1,112 millimeters per 
year to a high of 1,656 millimeters, but the seasonal distribution is 
uneven. About 22 percent of the annual rainfall comes in August or 
September, depending upon the specific zone [6]. 
1 One rai equals 0.16 hectare. 
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The region had a population of 11.7 million in 1970, with a total 
of 1.9 million households of which 1.5 million were agricultural. In 
1970 there were approximately 6.1 residents per household of which 1.9 
were economically active. However, significant differences are apparent 
between sectors. Agriculture had 3.48 economically active members per 
household with only 1.3 per nonag household. The average farm hQuse-
hold in the Northeast included 6.27 members, based on an agricultural 
population of 9.4 million. 
NEREGON is a linear programming, interzone competition model with 
five consuming and five producing regions. The model used for this study 
contained 892 activities (433 real and 459 slack or disposal) and 409 
equations [6]. The activities in the model include one or more produc-
tion processes in each zone for each commodity on each type of land during 
each season where production has been observed historically. Separate 
activities have been defined for the same commodity whenever a distinct 
production process could be identified that would affect the resource 
requirement costs, and(or) yields. Although this does not provide for 
unlimited resource substitution, it does provide for some basic substi-
tution. 
In addition to the production activities, the model contains 
separate supporting activities for each zone. These include: marketing 
activities for each commodity; subsistence demand (on farm consumption) 
for selected commodities; capital borrowing by month from institutions, 
from relatives, and from merchants; and capital transfer activities. 
The Northeast model has separate bound sets for each zone which include 
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land by type and month, labor by month, capital by month, and capital 
borrowing by source. In addition to the bound sets for each zone, point 
demand estimates have been added in the form of regional marketing bounds 
for each commodity. The point demand estimates serve as upper limits 
for onfarm consumption and off-farm marketing at the prices specified in 
the model. These restraints force the five zones to compete against one 
another for a limited regional market. 
In mathematical notation, the model may be written as follows: 
Find a set of X's such that 
f(x) = ex 
is maximized subject to 
where, 
AX< B 
X> 0 
X is a column vector of production, marketing, and employment 
activities; 
C is a row vector of unit prices for activities; 
A is a matrix of input-output coefficients; and 
B is a column vector of resource and demand constraints. 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
The objective function to be maximized in the model is the sum of 
off-farm sales, the value of home consumption (valued at wholesale 
prices), cost of production, and interest charges on borrowed capital. 
6 
56 5 56 5 56 5 4 12 
f(x) = L: L: P .. MK .. l.J l.J + L: L: P .. SD .. l.J l.J + L: L: L: L: 
where, 
i=l j=l i=l j=l i=l j=l i=l m=l 
5 3 12 
C. ·51, X. ·51, + L: L: L: - I.k CB "k (1.4) l.J m l.J m j=l k=l m=l J m J m 
P .. is the wholesale price of the i-th commodity (see list at l.J 
end of model) sold or consumed in the j-th zone (j=l for 
Zone 01, 2 for Zone 02, etc.); 
MKij is the marketing (off-farm) of the i-th commodity in the 
j-th zone; 
SD .. is the subsistence demand (onfarm consumption) of the l.J 
i-th commodity in the j-th zone; 
Cijim is the cost of producing the i-th crop in the j-th zone on 
the 51,-th land type (i=l for floating paddy, 2 for irrigated 
paddy, 3 for nonirrigated paddy, and 4 for upland) starting 
in the m-th month (m=l for January, 2 for February, 3 for 
March, etc.). Crop refers to a particular commodity and 
cultural practice combination. Not all 56 crops are produced 
in any zone; 
X .. 0 is the rai of the i=th crop produced in the j-th zone on the l.J;vm 
1 51,-th land type starting in the m-th month; 
Ijkm is the interest charge for capital borrowed during the m-th 
month in the j-th zone from the k-th source (k-1,2,3 for 
institutions, relatives, and merchants, respectively); and 
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CBjkm is the capital borrowing (Baht) during the mrth month in the 
j-th zone from the k-th source. 
Crop production in a given zone is constrained by the total cropland 
available during a given time period in that zone. 
where, 
56 
Ln ~ L Xinm ~m i=l ~ R. = 1,2,3,4 
m = 1,2,3, ••• 12 
(1.5) 
LR.m is the amount of the R.-th land type available in the mrth month; 
and 
~m is as defined earlier. 
Crop production in a given zone is constrained by the total labor 
available during a given time period in that zone. 
where, 
56 
LB ) E H. Xi 
m i=l ~m m 
(1.6) 
LB is the number of hours of labor available for crop production 
m 
during the m-th month; 
Him is the hours of labor required to produce the i-th crop during 
the mrth month; and 
X. is as defined earlier. 
~m 
Crop production in a given zone is constrained by the total capital 
available during a given time period in that zone. Capital sources 
1 . . 
A detailed description of the crop activities in each zone is 
contained in Working Paper No. 2, Regional Agricultural Development in 
Thailand: Northeast Crop Model (NEREGON), DAE, MOAC, RTG, April 1975 [6]. 
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include cash or resources on hand plus borrowing from institutions, 
relatives, or merchants. The constraint is summarized in Equation 1.7: 
m = 1,2,3, ••• ,12 (1. 7) 
where, 
C is the capital (Baht) available for agricultural production in 
m 
the m-th month; 
Aim is the number of Baht required to produce the i-th crop during 
the m-th month; and 
Xim and CBkm are as defined earlier. 
However, capital available for borrowing from institutions and 
relatives is limited as follows: 
k = 1,2 (1.8) 
where, 
Bk is the limit of capital supply from the k-th source which can 
be borrowed during a given year; and 
CBkm is as defined earlier. 
In addition to land, labor, and capital constraints, sericulture 
activities in a given zone are constrained by the availability of silk-
worms in that zone. 
coc. > z.xi ~ ~ i = 50,51 (1. 9) 
where, 
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coci is the available supply of silkworms of the i-th type; 
Zi is the number of silkworms of the i-th type which can be 
supported on one rai of mulberry; and 
Xi is the number of rai of mulberry produced for the i-th type 
of silkworms. 
Home consumption and sale of commodities from a given zone is 
constrained by the amount of commodity produced in that zone. 
where, 
56 
RT. > L 
l. i=l 
RTi is the transfer row for the i-th commodity; 
(1.10) 
Yi~m is the yield coefficient for the i-th crop produced on the ~-th 
type land starting in the ~th month; and 
Xi~m' SDi' and MKi are as defined earlier. 
Sales are further bounded by a regional market constraint which 
fixes an upper bound on the total home consumption and sales in the region. 
5 5 
RMKB. > r SDiJ. + L MKiJ. 
l. j=l j=l 
where, 
RMKBi is the upper bound on the total regional home consumption 
and sales of the i-th commodity; and 
SDij and MKij are as defined earlier. 
Subsistence demand for a given commodity in a given zone must be 
met by production in that zone. Column bounds are used to insure that 
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subsistence demand requirements are met before resources are used for 
production of alternative commodities. Because the same price was used 
for subsistence demand and marketing activities, equalities were used on 
the subsistence demand activities to force sales above subsistence demand 
to pass through the marketing activities for accounting purposes. The 
bounds are: 
4 
L 
$1..=1 
12 
L Yin X. n 1 ;vm 1;vm m= 
i = 1' 2 '3 ' ••• '56 
where, SDi, Yi$1..m' and Xi$1..m are defined earlier. 
The commodity codes used in the regional model are as follows: 
01 Nonglutinous rice 26 Sugarcane, fresh 
05 Glutinous rice 27 Sugarcane, processing 
09 Maize, feed 28 Tobacco, native 
10 Maize, food 29 Tobacco, Virginia 
12 Mung bean 35 Tobacco, Turkish 
14 Soybean 40 Watermelon 
18 Groundnut 50 Sericulture, native 
21 Kenaf 51 Sericulture, hybrid 
22 Jute 54 Silk cloth, native 
23 Cotton 55 Silk cloth, hybrid 
24 Castor seed 56 Sericulture, Japanese 
25 Cassava 
(1.12) 
Normative supply curves were-derived for each of the four selected 
commodities through a series of solutions over a wide range of prices. 
As each commodity was studied individually, the upper bound on market 
demand was released for that commodity. It is not assumed or implied 
that this is a realistic market assumption. In fact, both domestic and 
export demand appear to be quite price responsive. Whether or not a 
demand exists at each price analyzed depends on the national setting, 
world market, and export policy. The study is designed to analyze what 
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would happen to agricultural production, employment, income, resource 
use, etc., if the demand did exist at the specified prices. If the 
resulting impacts are desirable, then policy makers can examine ways of 
expanding demand and(or) supporting prices to achieve the desired pro-
duction response. This study focuses on the impact of higher prices 
rather than the means to achieve those price levels. 
The primary objective of the study is to estimate a normative 
supply curve for each of the four commodities, given the general resource 
base, technology, and specified demand for other commodities in the model. 
Prices of all other commodities are held constant as the price of the 
commodity in question is varied. The secondary objective of the study 
is to estimate the impact which changes in the price structure have on 
income and employment levels, as well as production and resource use 
patterns. Although the direct impact on the production of a given com-
modity may be important to policy makers, the secondary impacts on other 
subsectors may be equally important. Only when studied within the 
general competitive framework of the regional model can the policy 
maker assess the net impact of a specific actionsuchas supporting a 
given commodity price. 
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SUPPLY RESPONSE STUDIES 
Rice Subsector 
Rice dominates the economy and welfare of farmers in Northeast 
Thailand, as it does much of the Kingdom. Over the last 15 years, planted 
area has ranged from a low of 35 million rai to a high of 47 million rai 
for the whole Kingdom (Table 1). Northeast Thailand has roughly 45 per-
cent of the total planted area [1] and produces 4 to 5 million tons of 
paddy rice annually for 30 to 40 percent of the total production. Based 
on preliminary solutions to NEREGON, rice generated roughly 65 percent 
of the total value of crop production in the Northeast in the 1971-72 
base year [6, Table 12]. Consequently, although the Northeast is basically 
a rainfed area, paddy rice is the main backbone of the Northeast agricul-
tural economy. Thailand has consistently exported 1 to 2 million tons 
of rice annually which generates 15 to 20 percent of the total foreign 
earnings. Rice premiums collected on exports have ranged from just under 
300 million Baht1 to over 1.3 billion Baht in the five years up to 1972. 
This makes rice a key factor in the agricultural economy as well as a 
major source of government revenue. 
Rice Supply Response 
Eight solutions were obtained for the rice model at 500 Baht 
increments from 500 Baht to 4,000 Baht per ton, wholesale paddy price [8]. 
1 One Baht equals about US $0.05, an exchange of approximately 20 
Baht per US $1.00. 
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As the price was increased from 500 Baht to 4,000 Baht per ton, planted 
area increased from 25.0 million rai to almost 29.4 million rai, or a 
17.6 percent increase (Figure 1). The increase in planting was very 
rapid from 500 to 1,500 Baht. From 1,500 to 3,500 Baht, the increase 
was relatively steady, but much smaller. Above 3,500 Baht, the area 
again takes another sharp increase on up to 4,000 Baht. 
Table 1. Area, yield, and wholesale price of rice in Thailanda 
Crop Year Planted Area Average Yield Wholesale Price 
(1,000 rai) (Kg/rai) (Baht/ton) b 
1958/59 35,887 240 830.77 
1959/60 37,909 223 850.96 
1960/61 37,012 256 910.81 
1961/62 38,619 256 1,097.17 
1962/63 41,168 267 955.08 
1963/64 41,229 281 770.01 
1964/65 40,872 278 839.16 
1965/66 40,961 268 1,210.44 
1966/67 46,454 257 1,232.72 
1967/68 41,612 231 1,158.25 
1968/69 45,173 229 1,100.00 
1969/70 47,400 283 1,024.01 
1970/71 46,840 290 992.83 
1971/72 47,043 292 851.15 
1972/73 44,620 262 1,099.61 
aSOURCE: Agricultural Statistics of Thailand, Crop Year 1972-73 [2]. 
b Wholesale paddy price delivered to mill in Bangkok. 
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500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 
Wholesale Price of Paddy Rice (Baht/Ton) 
Normative rice planting response to varied paddy price in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 16. 
4000 
Although technology is fixed in the model, resource substitution can 
take place through the numerous activities which have been defined, 
especially for rice. To some extent, the resource substitution is re-
fleeted in the comparison between Figures 1 and 2. The normative supply 
curve, in Figure 2, shows relatively steady response to price increases 
up to 2,000 Baht. From 2,000 to 2,500 Baht, there is virtually no impact. 
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Then, from 2,500 on up to 4,000 Baht, the response is significant again. 
The production increase from 5.5 million tons at 500 Baht to 6.4 million 
tons at 4,000 Baht represents about a 16-percent increase. An increase 
of 900,000 tons of paddy production would have a significant impact upon 
the export potential for Thailand. 
6.5 
6.4 
-
6.3 
Cll 
1::1 
0 6.2 ~ 
1::1 
~ 6.1 
r-1 
r-1 
~ 6.0 
..s 
Q) 5.9 CJ 
•r-t 
~ 
>. 5.8 
'1:1 
'g 5.7 p., 
1.1-l 
0 5.6 
1::1 
0 
~ 5.5 ~ 
CJ 
~ 
'1:1 
0 
1-1 p., 
Figure 2. 
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
Wholesale Price of Paddy Rice (Baht/Ton) 
Normative rice supply response to varied paddy price in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 16. 
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Rice Impacts on Other Crops 
Higher prices of rice definitely provide an economic incentive for 
farmers to expand rice production, even when other crops have to be 
given up. Summarizing the crop production patterns into five major crop 
groups simplifies the analysis. The initial impact of higher rice prices 
was to increase the total area under cultivation but also to induce produc-
tion of all commodity groups except rice. Rice prices up to 2,500 Baht 
were competitive with the food and feed group and caused steady reduc-
tions to approximately 635,000 rai at the 2,500 Baht level. Above that 
price, food and feed production remained constant (Table 2). Increasing 
rice prices from 500 to 1,000 Baht caused production of oil crops to 
decline. The same was true when the price was raised to 1,500 Baht, but 
above 1,500 Baht oil crop production remained unchanged. 
Fiber crops show the most significant response to changes in rice 
prices. As rice prices varied from 500 Baht to 4,000 Baht, fiber crops 
decreased by just over 1 million rai or about 27 percent. No significant 
adjustments resulted until rice price reached 2,000 Baht. Again from 
2,500 Baht to 3,500 Baht, the changes were relatively small. Nearly 
900,000 rai of the fiber crops were replaced when rice price was increased 
from 3,500 to 4,000 Baht. The remaining crop group, Other Crops, showed 
a slight reduction when the rice price increased from 500 Baht to 1,000 Baht, 
but remained constant from that point up to 2,500 Baht. Above 2,500 Baht, 
the area of other crops gradually decreased at each price level up to 
the 4,000 Baht levels. 
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Increased rice prices do provide sufficient economic incentive to 
increase rice production at every price increment studied. The two 
sharpest increases come in the 500-1,000 range, and the other in the 
3,500-4,000 range. At the lower end, most of the change in rice area 
is due to an increase in total cultivated area. At the upper end, the 
reduction represents a conversion from fiber crops to rice production. 
Throughout the rest of the price range, there is some competition with 
almost every crop group at every level. These adjustments raise ques-
tions about the impact on employment opportunities. 
Rice Impact on Employment 
The impact of various levels of rice price on rice production and 
production of other crops has already been discussed. Just as changes 
in price level would affect production patterns, they would also affect 
employment patterns. The overall impact is to reduce employment by about 
8.4 percent as price increased from 500 Baht to 4,000 Baht per ton and 
crop production adjusted accordingly. The least adjustment takes place 
between 2,000 Baht and 3,500 Baht where employment stabilizes at about 
4.3 billion hours (Table 3). Above 3,500 Baht there is another reduction 
of 55 million hours as price increased to 4,000 Baht. 
Differential impacts can be observed in the five zones. In Zone 
01 the only changes in employment are the reductions in the l,OOD-1,5000 
range and the 3,500-4,000 range. Zone 02 employment drops only when 
price raises from 500 to 1,000 Baht and remains constant thereafter. 
Zone 03 has a unique employment pattern. Employment drops as each 500 
19 
Baht increment is added up to 2,000 Baht. Above 2,000 Baht employment 
increases by 8 and 9 million hours, respectively, until the price reaches 
3,000 Baht. Employment holds steady in the 3,000-3,500 Baht range, and 
then drops again from 3,500 to 4,000 Baht. Zone 04 employment drops 
about 7.2 percent in the 1,000-1,500 range and then remains relatively 
constant. Zone 05 shows a steady decrease in employment up to 2,500 Baht 
and then remains constant. 
Table 3. Agricultural employment in Northeast Thailand under various 
rice price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05 Total 
Paddy 
(Baht/ton) (million hours) 
500 963 550 1,267 1,049 829 4,658 
1,000 963 499 1,251 1,051 829 4,593 
1,500 865 499 1,248 975 828 4,415 
2,000 865 499 1,199 975 785 4,323 
2,500 865 499 1,208 975 771 4,318 
3,000 865 499 1,217 974 770 4,325 
3,500 865 499 1,217 969 770 4,320 
4,000 815 499 1,215 966 770 4,265 
SOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 16. 
Rice Impact on Capital Requirements 
Capital utilization is an aggregate measure of resource requirements 
in production agriculture. The type of crops produced and -the tecJmolo.gy 
level used directly affects the land, labor, and capital mix required. 
Discussion in the previous section shows employment going doWn, in general, 
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as rice prices and production increases. The data in Table 4 reflect 
the significance of resource substitution in production. The capital 
utilization patterns are almost exactly opposite the employment patterns. 
Capital requirements increase throughout the price range up to 3,000 
Baht with the total requirement increasing by 12.9 percent. Above 3,000 
Baht the capital requirement drops again by 6.6 percent. 
In Zones 01, 02, and 04, the capital requirements remain remain 
relatively constant above 1,500 Baht paddy price. In Zone 03 the capital 
requirement increases up to 3,000 Baht and then remains constant. In 
Zone 05 the capital requirements increase up to 3,000 Baht, remain con-
stant to 3,500, and then drop sharply as price goes to 4,000 Baht. 
Table 4. Agricultural capital requirements in Northeast Thailand under 
various rice price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05· Total 
Paddy 
(Baht/ton) (million baht) 
500 158.8 71.6 343.2 223.9 169.9 967.4 
1,000 159.4 74.0 363.1 225.2 173.9 995.6 
1,500 172.8 74.0 362.8 241.9 173.2 1,024.7 
2,000 172.8 74.0 397.3 241.9 179.6 1,065.6 
2,500 172.8 74.0 397.3 241.9 189.4 1,075.4 
3,000 172.8 74.0 414.3 240.3 191.1 1,092.5 
3,500 172.8 74.0 414.3 239.9 191.1 1,092.1 
4,000 124.6 74.0 414.3 233.0 173.9 1,019.8 
SOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 16. 
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Rice Impact on Income 
At each solution level, the value of the program (net income) was 
recorded and used to calculate per capita net income estimates for the 
9.579 million people living in rural households in Northeast Thailand 
[8]. Net income in this calculation includes gross value of sales, plus 
onfarm consumption valued at market price, minus cost of production. 
This is not a measure of cash income, but rather a measure of net value 
of production. As indicated in Figure 3, per capita income increases at 
almost a perfectly linear or constant rate. More specifically, it in-
creases from 572 Baht per person when rice is 500 Baht per ton to 2,780 
Baht per person when rice is 4,000 Baht per ton. This increase represents 
nearly a 500 percent increase in per capita income level for all residents, 
not just the labor force. Applied to the labor force, of course, the 
increase would be much greater on a per capita basis. 
The steady increase in per capita income apparently reflects two 
major factors. First, because rice is so dominant in both the general 
economy and in the home consumption package, price increases have a 
dramatic impact upon the income and welfare of the paddy farmers. Second, 
the steady growth in income, in constrast to the nonlinear planting and 
production patterns in Figures 1 and 2, indicate that income and production 
of other crops are being given up in order to increase rice production, 
as already discussed. 
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Figure 3. Normative net income response to varied paddy prices in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a,b 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 16. 
bNet income measured as net cash income plus onfarm consumption 
valued at market price. 
Kenaf Subsector 
Kenaf production does not dominate the economy of Thailand like rice, 
but it is an important cash crop. For the whole Kingdom, planted area 
has ranged from a low of about .127 million rai to a high of about 2.95million 
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rai over the last 15 years (Table 5). Among the upland crops for the 
whole Kingdom, average planted area of kenaf ranked third behind maize 
and rubber in 1971-72 [4, p. 3]. Northeast Thailand had about 83 per-
cent, or nearly 2.4 million rai, of the total planted area in the 1971-72 
crop year. Based on preliminary solutions to NEREGON, fiber crops gener-
ated roughly 25.2 percent of the total value of crop production in the 
Northeast [6, Table 12]. Kenaf produced over 97 percent of the fiber 
income. Kenaf is particularly important to Thailand because of its 
contribution to foreign trade and exchange earnings. In 1972 kenaf ex-
ports exceeded 1,076 million Baht, or nearly 5 percent of the total 
domestic exports [2, pp. 94 and 103]. 
Kenaf Supply Response 
Six solutions were obtained for the kenaf model at 1,000 Baht 
increments from 500 Baht to 5,500 Baht per ton, wholesale retted kenaf 
price [9]. As the price was increased from 500 Baht to 5,500 Baht per 
ton, planted area increased from 1.0 million rai to just over 4.0 million 
rai, or a 400 percent increase (Figure 4). The increase in planting 
was very responsive from 500 to 2,500 Baht. From 2,500 Baht to 3,500 
Baht, area increased by 8.3 percent; but above 3,500 Baht there was 
practically no increase in planted area. 
Although technology is fixed in the model some resource substitution 
can take place through the various activities which have been defined. 
Only a limited amount of resource substitution is reflected in the kenaf 
response by comparing Figures 4 and 5. The normative supply curve, in 
24 
Figure 5, shows relatively steady response to price increase up to 2,500 
Baht. Above 2,500 Baht supply is relatively unresponsive to further 
price increases. 
Table 5. Area, yield, and wholesale price of kenaf in Thailanda 
Crop Year Planted Area Avera9e Yield Who1e•ale Price 
(1,000 rai) (Kg/rai) (Baht/ton) b 
1e58/59 127 233.1 2.30 
1959/60 278 190.5 2.24 
1960/61 977 208.4 3.17 
1961/62 1,1eo 201.8 3.57 
1962/63 712 192.0 2.34 
1963/64 957 222.9 2.73 
1964/65 1,365 225.2 2.85 
1965/66 2,401 227.0 3.02 
1966/67 3,314 213.0 3.30 
1967/66 2,177 197.0 1.98 
1968/69 1,565 204.0 2.42 
1969/70 2,358 166.7 2.66 
1970/71 2,631 156.4 2.81 
1971/72 2,891 145.0 2.66 
1972/73 2.951 145.0 4.45 
aSOURCE: [ 2]. 
b Wholesale price in Bangkok; 1958-67 retted kenaf (good), 1968-72 
retted kenaf (average grade A, B, and C). 
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Kenaf Impact on Other Crops 
At least within some limits, higher kenaf prices definitely provide 
an economic incentive for farmers to expand kenaf production, even when 
other crops have to be given up. To analyze changes in the crop produc-
tion patterns the crops have been summarized into five major crop groups 
(Table 6). Starting from the lowest price level, the initial impact of 
price change is to increase total planted area. The increase continues 
up to the 2,500 Baht price level and then total planted area drops very 
slightly as price increases. 
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The impact of the changing kenaf prices and production causes some 
reduction in each of the other four groups. Rice production drops as 
kenaf increases up to the 2,500 Baht price level, and then rice increases 
by about 20,000 rai and stabilizes at that level. Up to 2,500 Baht kenaf 
increases result in some reduction in food and feed grains. From 2,500 
to 3,500 Baht virtually all of the kenaf increases are at the expense 
of food and feed grains production. Oil crops experience adjustment only 
in the 1,500 to 3,500 Baht range. From 1,500 to 2,500 Baht, oil crop 
area actually increases. From 2,500 to 3,500 Baht the oil crops fall 
back to about 3.7 percent below original levels. Within the fiber crop 
group, substitution takes place as well. Initially, kenaf area consti-
tutes just under 70 percent of the fiber crops. At the high price level 
kenaf constitutes essentially all of the fiber crop area. Most of the 
substitution takes place below 2,500 Baht. Kenaf price and production 
has the least impact on the "Other Crops" group. Here, kenaf replaces 
some of the area as price increases to 2,500 Baht, but has little impact 
above that price level. 
Kenaf Impact on Employment 
Changing production patterns often signal significant changes in 
employment opportunities. In contrast to the rice situation, increasing 
production of kenaf results in moderate increases in employment (Table 7). 
However, the total impact is less than 4 percent even when price is in-
creased over the wide range from 500 to 5,500 Baht. 
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Table 7. Agricultural employment in Northeast Thailand under various 
kenaf price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05 Total 
Kenaf 
(Baht/ton) (million hours) 
500 924 594 1,102 1,045 814 4,479 
977 547 a a a 1,500 --- --- --- ---
2,500 969 549 1,236 1,048 825 4,627 
3,500 a a 1,263 1,048 825 --- --- ---
4,500 969 550 1,262 1,048 825 4,654 
5,500 969 550 1,262 1,048 825 4,654 
SOURCE: NEREGON- Solution 17. 
aData not available. 
a 
a 
Employment increases in all five zones except Zone 02 where employment 
dropped as price increased from 500 to 1,500 Baht. In Zones 01, 04, and 
05, employment increased up to 2,500 Baht level and then stabilized. 
In Zone 03 employment increased to the 3,500 Babt level and then remained 
constant. Given the historic price and production levels for kenaf, in-
creasing kenaf production offers little promise for increasing employment 
opportunities in agriculture with the current resource and technology 
bases. 
Kenaf Impact on Capital Requirements 
Capital requirements are affected by the level of kenaf production. 
As kenaf price was raised from 500 Baht to 2,500 Baht, the capital re-
quirements increased from 828.8 million Baht to 988.6 million Baht 
(Table 8), or about 19 percent. Above 2,500 the requirements appear to 
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fall slightly reflecting the reallocation of crop patterns as discussed 
earlier. However, the production patterns at the higher kenaf prices 
still require 18.8 percent more capital than at the lowest price level. 
Zone 02 reflects a unique pattern of capital use when the capital 
requirement increases up to the 2,SOO Baht price level and then falls 
back and stabilizes. Capital requirements in Zone OS drop as kenaf pro-
duction in the region increases up to the 2,SOO Baht price. The other 
three zones all have increasing capital requirements up to the 2,SOO 
Baht price level, and then constant requirements above that level. 
Table 8. Agricultural capital requirements in Northeast Thailand under 
various kenaf price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 4 Zone OS Total 
kenaf 
(Baht/ton) (million Baht) 
soo 130.1 S4.0 27S.O 18S.l 184.6 828.8 
l,SOO 1S4.4 70.8 a a a a --- --- --- ---
2,SOO 161.7 76.1 361.3 221.7 167.8 988.6 
3,SOO a 71.6 363.7 221.7 167.8 a --- ---
4,SOO 160.1 71.6 363.7 221.7 167.8 984.9 
s,soo 160.1 71.6 363.7 221.7 167.8 984.9 
SOURCE: NEREGON- Solution 17. 
~ata not available due to malfunction of computer printer. 
Kenaf Impact on Income 
At each solution level the value of the program (net income) was 
recorded and used to calculate per capita net income estimates for the 
9.S79 million people living in rural households in Northeast Thailand [9]. 
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Net income in this calculation includes gross value of sales, plus onfarm 
consumption valued at market price, minus cost of production. As indi-
cated in Figure 6, per capita income increases at almost a linear or 
constant rate. More specifically, it increases from 664 Baht per person 
when kenaf is 500 Baht per ton to 1,008 Baht when kenaf is 5,500 Baht 
per ton. This increase represents slightly over a 50 percent increase 
in per capita income level for all residents, not just the labor force. 
Applied to the labor force, of course, the increase would be much greater 
on a per capita basis. 
The increase in per capita income associated with the alternative 
price levels reflects a positive impact on farmers, but not a dramatic 
impact considering the wide range of prices analyzed. The steady growth 
in per capita income, in contrast to the nonlinear patterns in Figures 
4 and 5, indicates that income and production of other crops are being 
given up in order to increase kenaf, as discussed earlier. 
Cassava Subsector 
Cassava production is a large and growing activity in Thailand. 
Over the last 13 years, planted area for the Kingdom has ranged from a 
low of about .447 million rai to a high of about 2.039 million rai (Table 
9). The range of production only tells part of the story, however, as 
cassava production has been steadily increasing over time. In fact, 
the preliminary 1973-74 crop year data show another significant increase 
from just over 2 million rai to 2.67 million rai [13, p. 25]. Cassava 
production utilized the fourth largest crop area in Northeast Thailand 
32 
in the 1971-72 crop year, about .156 million rai [6, Table 9]. This 
accounts for a little over 11 percent of the national total. 
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A strong export market has been a key factor in the rapid expansion 
of cassava production. Exports have increased from 443 million tons of 
processed cassava (shredded, flour, pellets, and waste) in 1961 to 1,311 
million tons in 1972 [2, p. 98]. In 1972 cassava exports exceeded 1,546 
million Baht, or just over 7 percent of the total domestic exports [2, 
pp. 94 and 98]. 
Table 9. Area, yield, and wholesale price of cassava in Thailanda 
Crop 'i~ar PlA.nted. Area Averag~ Yield 'Wholesale Price 
(1,000 rai) (Kg/rai) (Baht/ton) b 
1960/61 Ltl}? 2,733.8 0,6) 
1961/62 621 2,779.4 o.65 
1962/63 767 2,708,0 O,?J 
196'3/M. 875 2.h12.6 0,62 
19f.J.J./65 656 2. 3?3. 5 Oo55 
1965/f>6 637 2, 315.5 0,?0 
1966/6? 81lJ. 2,)24.) 0.72 
196?/68 880 2,)4).2 0,5<) 
1968/69 1,666 2,449.) o. 53 
1969/70 1,1S:J 2,580.;., o.65 
1970/?1 1,403 2 ,4LJ.5. 5 0.?1 
19?1/72 1,)84 2,250.0 2.:&.4 
1972/73 2,039 2,0?2.0 2. J4 
aSOURCE: [2]. 
bWholesale price in Bangkok; 1960-68, 1971-72 cassava meal; 1969-70 
cassava pellets converted to meal price (conversion: one ton roots = 
392 kgs of meal= 365.5 kgs of pellets). 
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Cassava Supply Response 
Six solutions were obtained for the cassava model at 300 Baht 
increments from 100 Baht per ton to 1,600 Baht per ton, wholesale cassava 
price [10]. As price increased from 100 Baht to 1,600 Baht per ton 
planted area increased from no production to almost 3.8 million rai 
(Figure 7). For practical purposes, all of the increase came between 
100 and 400 Baht per ton. Above 400 Baht there was a very slight in-
crease in area, but the total increase in planted area from 400 to 1,600 
Baht was only 45.8 thousand rai, or about 1 percent of the production 
level at 400 Baht. This suggests that policies designed to manipulate 
price above 400 Baht would not be effective in stimulating production. 
The normative supply curve (Figure 8) shows a sharp response 
between 100 and 400 Baht per ton, as observed with area planted. Beyond 
400 Baht per ton there was very little supply response. The close corre-
lation between area planted and production, and the lack of response to 
prices above 400 Baht, suggest that very little resource substitution 
is taking place in cassava production. Although technology is fixed in 
the model, some resource substitution could take place through selection 
of alternative activities which have been defined in the model. 
Cassava Impact on Other Crops 
Prices do provide an economic incentive to farmers to increase 
cassava production even when other crops have to be given up. Because 
the cassava response is so distinct, it is relatively easy to describe. 
Increased prices do increase total area cultivated by a little over 2.5 
35 
percent but the big adjustment comes in crop substitution (Table 10). 
In the 100-400 range when cassava increased by 3. 7 million rai, 3.4 
million rai of the total was given up in the fiber crops. The other 
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unique circumstance is that the change in cropping patterns changed the 
resource demand pattern sufficiently to allow oil crops to increase by 
41,000 rai also. At all other price levels production remained nearly 
constant, reflecting the small change in cassava area above the 400 
Baht price level. 
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Figure 7. Normative cassava planting response to varied prices in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 18. 
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Cassava Impact on Employment 
Changes in crop production patterns resulting from changes in 
cassava price do effect the employment pattern in the Northeast (Table 
11). Total employment decreased from 4,631 million hours when no cassava 
was produced to 4,568 million hours when the price of cassava was between 
400 and 1,000 Baht (Table 11). Above 1,000 Baht employment increased 
again to 4,603 million hours. The total change in employment is less 
than 2 percent. 
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The impact in individual zones of the region differs slightly. In 
Zones 01, 04, and 05, employment declined as price increased from 100 
to 400 Baht and then remained constant. In Zones 02 and 03 the employ-
ment increased as price increased to 400 Baht and then, in Zone 02, re-
mained constant. In Zone 03 employment increased again above 1,000 
Baht. 
Table 11. Agricultural employment in Northeast Thailand under various 
cassava price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05 Total 
Cassava 
(Baht/ton) (million hours) 
100 963 547 1,234 1,062 825 4,631 
400 958 550 1,238 1,016 806 4,568 
700 958 550 1,238 1,016 806 4,568 
1,000 958 550 1,238 1,016 806 4,568 
1,300 958 550 1,273 1,016 806 4,603 
1,600 958 550 1,273 1,016 806 4,603 
SOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 18. 
Cassava Impact on Capital Requirements 
Basically the impact of expanded cassava production on capital 
requirements is exactly opposite the employment response. The total 
capital requirement increased from 972.7 million Baht at 100 Baht per 
ton for cassava to a high of 1,118.5 million Baht at 700 Baht per ton 
(Table 12). Above 700 Baht, capital utilization declined to 1,115.6 
million Baht at the 1,600 Baht price. The total change represents just 
under 15 percent. 
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Table 12. Agricultural capital requirements in Northeast Thailand under 
various cassava price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05 Total 
Cassava 
(Baht/ton) (million Baht) 
100 159.4 69.4 361.1 214.0 168.8 972.7 
400 182.8 71.6 362.2 246.8 210.0 1,073.4 
700 181.6 71.6 362.2 246.9 256.2 1,118.5 
1,000 181.3 71.6 362.2 246.9 256.2 1,118.2 
1,300 181.3 71.6 359.8 246.9 256.0 1,115.6 
1,600 181.3 71.6 359.8 246.9 256.0 1,115.6 
SOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 18. 
In each of the five zones capital requirements increased when price 
increased from 100 Baht to 400 Baht. Capital use remained nearly con-
stant after that with one exception. In Zone 05 capital utilization 
increased by 22 percent from 400 Baht to 700 Baht. 
Cassava Impact on Income 
At each solution level the value of the program (net income) was 
recorded and used to calculate per capita income estimates for the 9.579 
million people living in rural households in Northeast Thailand [10]. 
Net income in this calculation includes gross value of sales, plus onfarm 
consumption valued at market price, minus cost of production. This is 
nota measure of cash income but rather a measure of net value of pro-
duction. As indicated in Figure 9, per capita income increases almost 
at a linear or constant rate as prices are increased. More specifically, 
40 
it increases from 779 Baht per person when cassava is 100 Baht per ton 
to 1,781 Baht per person when cassava is 1,600 Baht per ton. This in-
crease respresents a little over a 200 percent increase in per capita 
income level for all residents, not just the labor force. Applied to 
the labor force, of course, the increase would be much greater on a per 
capita basis. 
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Figure 9. Normative net income response to varied cassava prices in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a,b 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 18. 
bNet income measured as net cash income plus onfarm consumption 
valued at market prices. 
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The steady increase in per capita income apparently reflects two 
major factors. First, although the area planted to cassava is not ex-
tremely large in Northeast Thailand, the volume of production (approxi-
matekly 7.0 million tons) is significant when price policies are considered. 
At this level of production every 100 Baht per ton increase in price 
would change per capita income by approximately 73 Baht. Second, the 
steady growth in income, in contrast to the nonlinear production patterns, 
indicates that production and income of other crops are being given up 
in order to increase cassava production. 
Maize Subsector 
Maize is the dominant upland food crop in Thailand, with the 1971-72 
crop representing 67.5 percent of the area planted to the principal 
upland food crops [1, p. 52]. Production has expanded steadily from 
less than 300,000 rai in 1953-54 to over 6.2 million rai in 1972-73 
(Table 13). Preliminary data for crop year 1973-74 indicate that the 
trend in production is continuing with the planted area exceeding 6.8 
million rai [13, p. 23]. During the 1971-72 crop year, maize production 
utilized the third largest crop area in Northeast Thailand, about 522,000 
rai [6, Table 9]. This accounts for about 8.2 percent of the national 
total. 
A strong export market has been a key factor in rapid expansion 
of maize production. Exports have increased from about 34,700 tons of 
maize in 1953 to 1.93 million tons of maize and 86,500 tons of meal in 
1972 [2, p. 97]. In 1972 maize exports exceeded 2,086 million Baht, or 
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Table 13. Area, yield, and wholesale price of maize in Thailanda 
Crop Year Planted Area Aver~e Yield ··~holeeale .Price (1,000 ra1) (kg :ra1) (Baht/kg) b 
1953/54 298 173 1. 50 
1954/55 331 191 1. 30 
1955/56 347 196 1.20 
1956/57 514 225 1.16 
1957/'13 606 229 0.96 
1958/59 792 238 1.04 
19.59/60 1.249 256 1.01 
1960/61 1,785 306 1.02 
1961/62 1,916 321 1.12 
1962/63 2,050 331 1.01 
1963/64 2,612 353 1.06 
19f:A/65 3,4h9 276 1.04 
1965/66 3,605 291 1.22 
1966/67 4,083 ;oh 1.1?. 
1967/68 4,1)8 352 1.17 
1968/69 4,193 398 0.97 
1969/70 li-,248 400 1.10 
1970/71 5,180 )80 1.2) 
1971/72 6,)68 3~0 1.19 
1972/73 6,231 211 1.14 
aSOURCE: [2]. 
bWholesale price for shelled, yellow maize (including gunny bags) 
delivered in Bangkok. 
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about 9.65 percent of the total domestic exports [2, pp. 94 and 97]. 
The 1972 volume of exports placed maize second behind rice. 
Maize Supply Response 
The maize model was solved seven times at 250 increments from 500 
to 2,000 Baht per ton, wholesale maize price [11]. As the price was 
increased from 500 Baht to 2,000 Baht per ton, area planted increased 
from 91,000 rai to over 5.0 million rai (Figure 10). The increase in 
planting was relatively small from 500 to 750 Baht, but considerably 
larger from 750 to 1,000 Baht. From 1,000 to 1,250 Baht the planted 
area increased by more than 3.1 million rai. Nearly another million 
rai was added when the price increased to 1,500 Baht. Beyond 2,500 
Baht the response to further price increases was relatively small. 
Although technology is fixed in the model, resource substitution 
can take place through the various activities which have been defined. 
To some extent, the resource substitution is reflected in the comparison 
between Figures 10 and 11. The normative 'supply curve, in Figure 11, 
shows supply response breaking into three distinct segments. The response 
from 500 to 1,000 Baht and 1,500 to 2,000 is relatively small, while 
significant response is experienced from 1,000 to 1,500. This suggests 
that policies designed to manipulate price below 1,000 Baht or above 
1,500 Baht per ton would have much less impact on supply than in the 
range from 1,000 to 1,500 Baht. The observed supply response is par-
ticularly significant when it is noted from Table 13 that the prevailing 
price of maize has consistently been at or just over 1,000 Baht per ton. 
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Thus, it appears that only a small amount of support for the maize 
price would produce a large response. 
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Figure 10. Normative maize planting response to varied maize prices in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 19. 
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Normative maize supply response to varied maize prices in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 19. 
The solution level for area planted at 1,000 Baht compares 
favorably with the actual planting in the Northeast at a similar price. 
If supply would respond as indicated in the solution, supporting the 
price at 1,250 would result in expanded production of 772,000 tons. 
1 Assuming that domestic demand would not increase, the additional supply 
1rf any demand response could be anticipated, it would be a decrease, 
not an increase. 
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would be available for export. An increased supply of 772,000 tons in 
the Northeast in 1971-72 would have been enough to increase national 
maize exports by 38 percent, assuming an export demand. Similarly, if 
price had been 1,500 Baht and supply in the Northeast had been 1.318 
million tons, exports could have increased by more than 55 percent. 
Maize Impact on Other Crops 
The level of maize price does provide economic incentive for farmers 
to expand maize production, even if other crops must be reduced. The 
overall impact of the price changes studied was to increase total 
planted area by about 1.0 million rai while maize increased by nearly 
5.0 million rai (Table 14). The maize production has very little impact 
on rice, other food and feed crops, or "Other Crops." It does have an 
impact on oil and fiber crops. As with cassava, the reorganized produc-
tion pattern allows oil crop production to increase at the same time 
maize production increases. The real competition is between maize and 
fiber crops. Of the 4.97 million rai increase in maize, 3.58 million 
or more than 70 percent is at the expense of fiber production. The big-
gest adjustments come at the 1,000-1,250 and 1,250-1,500 Baht price 
levels, but the competition between maize and fiber crops is apparent 
at all levels. 
Maize Impact on Employment 
The overall impact of raising maize price from 500 to 2,000 Baht 
per ton and the subsequent changes in crop production patterns was to 
lower the employment in the Northeast Region by 4.5 percent. In 
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general, employment declines steadily as maize replaces other crops, 
except for the increase when price rose from 750 to 1,000 Baht (Table 15). 
Table 15. Agricultural employment in Northeast Thailand under various 
maize price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05 Total 
Maize 
(Baht/ton) (million hours) 
500 977 547 1,253 1,050 825 4,652 
750 963 548 1,243 1,051 825 4,630 
1,000 975 549 1,262 1,046 832 4,664 
1,250 975 547 1,142 1,047 850 4,561 
1,500 975 503 1,142 990 850 4,460 
1,750 975 503 1,142 990 850 4,460 
2,000 970 503 1,142 977 850 4,442 
SOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 19 
Within individual zones, the impact on employment varies depending 
on the level of production. In Zone 01 employment dropped as price 
rose from 500 to 750 Baht, increased and remained constant from 1,000 
to 1,750 Baht, and dropped again at 2,000 Baht. In Zone 02 employment 
remained relatively unchanged up to 1,250 Baht, and then dropped by 10 
million hours at 750 Baht. It then rose by 20 million hours at 1,000 
Baht and then dropped by 120 million hours at 1,250 Baht where it 
steadied. In Zone 04 there was an employment drop at 1,000 Baht and 
another drop at 1,500 Baht. Zone 05 counters the general trend by 
raising employment at 1,000 Baht and again at 1,250 Baht. The differences 
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in labor utilization reflect different resource distributions and 
comparative production advantages throughout the region. The impact on 
employment is directly related to the production patterns and the com-
petitiveness of maize with the production of a particular zone. As 
with other commodities, an increase in maize production within the zone 
does not necessarily imply a uniform employment impact on all zones. 
Maize Impact on Capital Requirements 
Maize production requires significant capital inputs. Increasing 
price from 500 Baht to 2,000 Baht per ton increases production and, thus, 
the capital requirements by about 6 percent. The requirements increase 
at all levels of production except the 2,000 Baht level where capital 
requirements decline slightly (Table 16). 
Table 16. Agricultural capital requirements in Northeast Thailand under 
various maize price assumptions--base year 1971-72 
Price of Zone 01 Zone 02 Zone 03 Zone 04 Zone 05 Total 
Maize 
(Baht/ton) (million Baht) 
500 154.4 69.4 362.9 225.4 168.0 980.1 
750 159.4 72.6 362.0 225.2 167.8 987.0 
1,000 163.7 76.1 363.7 220.6 178.9 1,003.0 
1,250 163. 7 73.9 352.4 223.2 206.3 1,019.5 
1,500 163.7 85.4 352.4 234.3 206.3 1,042.1 
1,750 163. 7 85.4 352.4 234.3 206.3 1,042.1 
2,000 169.3 85.4 352.4 228.1 206.3 1' 041.5 
SOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 19. 
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As with employment, the impact on individual zones differs. Zone 01 
capital requirements increase up to the price level of 1,000 Baht and 
then remain constant until they increase again at 2,000 Baht. In Zone 
02 the requirements increase to the 1,000 Baht level, drop at 1,250, 
and then rise to a new constant at 1,500 Baht. In Zone 03 all of the 
adjustment is below 1,250 Baht. The requirement decreases at 750, in-
creases at 1,000, and decreases again at 1,250 Baht. In Zone 04 the 
requirement is relatively constant except for a small increase at 1,500 
and 1,750 Baht. In Zone 05 the requirement increases at 1,000 and 1,250 
Baht, and then remains constant. Again, the impact on capital require-
ments reflects the changing production patterns and comparative 
advantages. 
Maize Impact on Income 
At each solution level, the value of the program (net income) was 
recorded and used to calculate per capita net income estimates for the 
9.579 million people living in rural households in Northeast Thailand 
[11]. Net income in this calculation includes gross value of sales, 
plus onfarm consumption valued at market price, minus cost of production. 
This is not a measure of cash income, but rather a measure of net value 
of production. As indicated in Figure 12, per capita income increases 
at almost a linear rate. More specifically, it increases from 785 
Baht per person when price is 500 Baht per ton to 903 Baht per person 
when the price is 2,000 Baht per ton. 
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Normative income response to varied mai~e prices in 
Northeast Thailand--base year 1971-72a' 
aSOURCE: NEREGON - Solution 19. 
bNet income measured as net cash income plus onfarm 
consumption valued at market price. 
Two facts are conspicuous after studying Figure 12. First, the 
increase in per capita income from 785 to 903 Baht represents only about 
a 15 percent increase while maize price was increasing by 400 percent. 
Second, the linear growth of income in contrast to the nonlinear pro-
duction response, suggests major crop substitution. The additional 
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production of maize does not generate a corresponding increase in income. 
Thus, the expanded maize production must be causing major resource 
transfers to maize production from other commodities. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Production Response 
All four of the subsectors studied--rice, kenaf, cassava, and 
maize--confirm the hypothesis that price policy which would raise the 
price of that commodity relative to other commodities does provide an 
economic incentive to expand planted area and production of the selected 
crop. However, the commodities do not all respond in the same manner 
to various price increases. For example, rice and maize production 
responded to incremental price increases throughout the range of prices 
assumed for the studies. In contrast, kenaf responded to price increases 
in the lower range of prices considered, but was relatively unresponsive 
to prices in the upper half of the range studied. Cassava responded 
at very low price levels, and was virtually unresponsive at all other 
levels. This suggests that rice and maize have a wide range over which 
price policy could be used effectively to promote production while 
kenaf and cassava have a relatively small range in which price policy 
would be an effective instrument to promote production. Although these 
studies are normative supply response studies, there is significant 
evidence in Thailand that farmers do respond to price incentives. 
Cassava is a good case in point. A strong export market has provided 
strong prices. The production of cassava has responded rather dramatically 
with virtually no other promotion considerations. 
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Another aspect of the price policy question concerns the extent 
to which prices would have to be raised to get significant responses. 
The gap between current price and a level which would produce signifi-
cant results obviously is related to the degree of difficulty or amount 
of government expenditure necessary to get desired responses. For rice, 
the traditional prices have been in the very responsive section of the 
supply curve, meaning that either increases or decreases in price could 
have significant impact. Kenaf prices have been in the unresponsive 
upper end of the price scale recently. Thus, increasing the price may 
not have a significant impact; but guaranteeing a base price might 
protect production from a major drop. Cassava prices have been high 
on the unresponsive section of the supply curve. Further price supports 
probably would prove ineffective but the historic production pattern 
indicates that farmers are steadily increasing their production up to 
levels commensurate with the current price level. Historic price levels 
for maize have been at the lower end of the responsive section of the 
supply curve. This suggests that a minimum of effort in promoting or 
supoorting price could produce significant increases in maize production. 
A third aspect of price policy is the impact of price changes in 
one commodity sector on another sector. Expanded rice production com-
petes with all other crop groups. Kenaf competes with rice, food and 
feed, and other fiber crops. Cassava and maize compete most directly 
with the fiber crops. If a specific crop is being promoted, it mat be 
desirable to have it compete ~rith specific crops. For example, it may 
be desirable as a government policy to replace fiber production with 
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maize. If so, promotion of maize is totally compatible with reducing 
fiber. However, if it is not desirable to reduce fiber production, the 
maize policy could be in direct conflict with the fiber policy. The 
important point is that price policy for one commodity definitely is 
not independent of impact on other commodities. 
A fourth aspect of price policy is the impact on consumers. The 
studies of supply response do not deal with this topic directly, but 
several observations can be drawn. One of the most obvious is that any 
type of price support or stabilization policy to promote production will 
almost certainly mean higher consumer prices. In the case of exports, 
the higher price may be to foreign buyers and relatively insignificant 
to the local consumers. But when the product is consumed domestically, 
the higher farm prices mean higher consumer prices. The exception is 
with subsidized farm prices, but then the subsidy must come out of tax 
revenue and is transmitted back to consumers indirectly. The price prob-
lem becomes even more complex when the prom~ted commodity is an inter-
mediate good for further production. This is especially true in agri-
culture when you are trying to promote feed production and livestock 
at the same time. Higher maize or cassava prices mean higher feed 
prices for the livestock industry. An exception is with rice promotion 
where the by-products can be used as feed. Promotion of rice should 
generate larger supplies of rice bran and broken rice which could be 
used for food. 
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Employment 
Labor requirements differ significantly between commodities and 
depending on the level of technology used. Promotion of a given com-
modity through price policy or related programs may change the produc-
tion patterns and rural employment significantly. In a region where 
unemployment or underemployment is a major problem, promoting a crop 
plan that reduced employment further could have serious impacts. 
The four commodities studied produced very different impacts. 
Rice and maize promotion resulted in lower employment levels. Kenaf 
promotion resulted in cropping changes which produced a net increase 
in employment. Cassava had an indifferent impact--at some levels it 
raised employment and at others it lowered employment. The impact is 
very commodity-specific and should not be generalized without careful 
analysis of individual commodities. 
An aspect of employment which can be dealt with more effectively 
in the Employment Model [7, 12], is the seasonality of employment. If 
off-farm employment or cottage industry employment could be generated, 
it might be desirable to promote a crop evenifit lowered agricultural 
employment, provided that it helped distribute employment more evenly 
over the year. One of the difficulties of dealing with the labor prob-
lem in the Northeast is that nearly all the labor force is employed 
during the rainy season and virtuallynoneduring the dry season. It 
is difficult to develop off-farm employment opportunities which have 
the same seasonality. Employing fewer people in agriculture, but for 
the whole year, might make the unemployment problem easier to resolve. 
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Capital Requirements 
Land, labor, and capital are the key resources in agricultural 
production. Labor seems to be restricting production at some periods 
of the year and surplus at others. Capital is in short supply in the 
Northeast with large amounts being borrowed from relatives, institutions, 
and merchants. At best the supply is adequate, and the charges are high. 
If new production patterns are to be promoted with price policy or other 
programs, serious consideration must be given to the capital require-
ments which must be met to support the program. A shortage of land, 
labor, capital, or incentive can destroy any program. 
All four of the commodities studied result in production patterns 
which require greater amounts of capital as the price of the commodity 
in question increases. The increased requirements could be as high as 
12.9, 19.3, 15.0, and 6.3 percent, respectively, for rice, kenaf, 
cassava, and maize. It may be desirable to provide even greater amounts 
of capital at institutional rates to avoid high interest charges for 
the farmer. These estimates of increased capital requirements do not 
deal with any existing capital problems in the Northeast. These studies 
deal strictly with the additional capital that would be required as 
specific commodities were promoted. If the capital is not made avail-
able it could form a bottleneck which would defeat any price incentive 
program. 
Income 
The income impact of various price policy programs vary significantly. 
For the four commodities considered, the range of impact is from 15 
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percent to more than 500 percent. Maize and kenaf produce the smallest 
impact on per capita income by only raising it 15 and 50 percent, 
respectively. In contrast, cassava could raise per capita income by 
200 percent. Rice is by far the most significant with an increase of 
500 percent. Admittedly, paddy price probably will not reach 4,000 
Baht in Thailand in the near future, but that is not far off the world 
price. Even if the price only went to 3,000 Baht, it would increase 
per capita income by more than 270 percent in the Northeast. Probably 
no single policy could be as effective in raising the income level of 
Northeast farmers as a policy which raised rice price. The impact is 
significant because such a large portion of the area in the Northeast 
is devoted to rice production. Higher rice prices would also be de-
sirable because of the distribution effects. With a large portion of 
the population producing rice, the benefits would be distributed widely 
without further supervision. As an example, raising rice price 500 Baht 
from 1,500 Baht should raise income levels in the Northeast by about 
27 percent. Raising 500 Baht from 2,000 should raise income more than 
21 percent. Price policy could be an effective instrument to impact 
on income levels and distribution. 
SUMMARY 
Considerable literature has been written about the supply 
responsiveness of small farmers in developing countries. Although this 
study is normative in nature and offers no direct empirical evidence to 
quarantee farmers will respond as indicated, there is strong evidence 
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in Thailand that farmers do respond to economic incentives. This study 
has focused on potential economic opportunities that increased prices 
would create, given the current technology. The sharp increases in area 
planted, production, and value of production suggest that increasing 
prices could have a very significant impact on the welfare of rural 
people. The cost, of course, would be higher prices to consumers. How-
ever, when rural income levels are compared with urban income levels, 
it appears that the redistribution is economically appropriate. Whether 
it is politically feasible is a question that only the policy makers 
can answer. 
This study focused only on one price change at a time. In future 
studies it may be useful to consider sets of price changes rather than 
single price changes. In some cases where one commodity competes 
directly with another, increasing both prices may significantly impact 
on income level wihtout significantly changing production patterns. 
In addition to the direct supply response, an attempt was made 
to describe some of the secondary impacts which would result from 
changes in price levels. These secondary impacts were measured in terms 
of impact on other crop production, employment levels, capital require-
ments, and per capita income. From these related discussions of the 
secondary impacts measured by the models, it is clear that a program 
defined for one commodity is rarely isolated from effects on other 
commodities. What may be a simple and easily administered policy may 
have very serious side effects. Knowing these side effects should help 
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the policy maker choose more wisely among alternatives or to develop 
complimentary programs to compensate for the negative secondary effects. 
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